

Can a board of foreign missions always avoid a debt? Yes, if that is its chief aim. A secretary of a home missionary board once appeared before a General Assembly with a glowing report of a handsome balance in the treasury, though it appeared that this had been accomplished at a lamentable sacrifice to the actual work on the field; and instead of being commended, he received only withering rebukes for having seemed to suppose that a hoarded balance was the chief end of a missionary board. Yes, even a foreign missionary board can keep out of debt if it is deaf to the just claims of the work abroad and blind to the spirit and demands of the churches at home.

But if it be asked whether a foreign board in the legitimate use of its functions can *always* keep out of debt, we say no. Generally it can, but not always. Changes will sometimes occur on the field or at home, which, planning as it must a year in advance, it cannot foresee. What the churches demand is that the work shall be kept up with a firm step and that nothing which has been gained shall be sacrificed.

When a board cuts so far within the lines of a healthy growth as to render a debt absolutely impossible, two things will occur: (1) The gifts of the churches will begin to take special and stipulated forms in order to evade the severe retrenchments, sympathy will spring up for the missionaries, and the Sabbath-schools and auxiliary societies will stipulate that their contributions shall be devoted to "new work." Relatives and friends, distrusting the "management," will send their gifts direct. (2) More and more churches and individuals will turn aside from their own board and will patronize other societies which they consider more "wide awake." They "wish to give where there are some signs of progress, where there is a real advance," etc. Especially do they favor those taking objects which are represented by personal appeals. Last year our Presbyterian churches, while allowing the old deficit of \$57,000 to remain unpaid, gave \$112,000 for foreign missions through outside channels.

There is nothing which the people insist

upon more emphatically than progress; nothing with which they have so little patience as a dead or stationary enterprise from which all enthusiasm has vanished. This may seem very inconsistent with the criticisms which appear against debts, but it is true: such is the difficulty which confronts even the wisest administration.

missed I was again requested to come in, and was told her Majesty would like to have me come on the morrow, and I might now go in peace.

Some medicine was prepared and sent to her. On Monday Dr. Allen again accompanied me, and the same formula was gone through with, only the Queen was feeling better. The Queen was very gracious. She is quite good-looking, and has a pleasant smile. The King also was pleasant; he asked me was I from San Francisco or Washington.

There, coming in at the gate, is the Queen's messenger. She is better, and kindly sent the man to tell me so! Gratefully I return thanks to the all-loving Heavenly Father, who holds in His hands the ruling of the universe, and who has blessed my attendance on the Queen.

The cholera is here, and the people are dying by hundreds. On Saturday I was out for the first time, and during my ride saw four bodies carried by, and one little child just giving its last gasp. In nearly every house the sound of wailing could be heard. One woman, just outside the wall, held the stiffened form of a child close to her. She swayed and moaned piteously.

The people are filthy, eat green fruit and drink vile water. It is no wonder they die in such great numbers. Our own danger is comparatively small, though it is present. But we have caring for us the loving and all-powerful Jehovah, and in His hand are we kept day and night. We are taking all possible precautions.

On Monday of last week the Presb. Mission met, and the question of the desirability of organizing a Union Church among the foreigners in Seoul was talked of. A committee were appointed to confer with the Methodist brethren. It was decided to organize, and a committee waited on our U. S. Minister here, Mr. Parker, to gain his consent for the erection of a building in which we may worship. Mr. Parker was not only favorable, but for the present has given us the use of a room at the Legation. This week there were present twenty-one in all, the largest number ever met for divine worship in Korea.

Cholera is rapidly abating, and soon we hope to be entirely free from the dire plague.

KOREA.

FIRST PATIENTS—THE CHOLERA.

SEOUL, August 10th, 1886.

MISS ANNIE ELLERS.—Several items of interest have occurred, and these I hasten to announce knowing the ladies will be interested in hearing of my first case and patient. On Sunday afternoon, the 7th inst., Dr. Allen was called to attend the Chinese Minister's wife. As her pulse was shown him, the hand being covered, he could not of course ascertain her state, and told them they better call in the lady doctor (for the medical gentlemen here have dubbed me doctor). I was called upon by the Minister's secretary and conducted to the Chinese Legation, where I saw Mrs. Yenz. I have been to see her a number of times, and she is slowly recovering.

After I came home from the Legation, I found the Queen had sent for me, and Dr. Allen was to accompany me. We were carried in chairs, four were carrying each, and preceded by soldiers. We were carried to the side gate, where we got out and walked. Passing through several large gates and down a broad, shaded walk, a beautiful sight met our eyes, — a large artificial lake, having in the center a pavilion, beautifully painted. To get to the lake, draw-bridges were stationed at intervals; there, trees and many flowers were in the neighboring ground. Prince Min Yong Ik met us and showed us some of the new dwellings the King is having built. After this, we were conducted to the reception room; here were nice foreign chairs and rugs. We waited some time. I was then conducted to the Queen. The King, Crown Prince and Queen were all in waiting, and received me informally and kindly. I was given a chair in front of the King, and the Queen addressed a few remarks to me expressive of the hope that I would like Korea, and the heat would not make me sick, and I would remain here a long time. To all this I returned thanks. The Prince then gave me a seat by the Queen, and I was requested to examine her. I used the thermometer, something very strange to them; took her pulse, and used the stethoscope. After the examination she was dismissed, and Dr. Allen called to examine

(The King)

The woman visited for 15 minutes in Queen's Mission Field Vol I, 1886, p. 493



KIM OK KUN, THE COREAN PATRIOT.

(By favor of the *Illustrated Christian Weekly*.)

Among the more intelligent and liberal minded Corean statesmen, whose influence has helped to open the country and introduce the present more liberal policy, *Kim Ok Kun* has been very prominent. The Rev. H. Loomis gives the following brief sketch of him, which merits a permanent record:

"The establishment of a new and better era of things in Corea is largely due to the enlightened views and energetic efforts of Kim Ok Kun, the head of the Progressionists, or the Liberal Party. Although he was originally a man of only medium rank, his distinguished abilities have rendered him the acknowledged leader in reform and a confidential and faithful counsellor of the Government.

He has twice visited Japan upon important business, and was recently Vice-Minister of Foreign affairs, but practically the head of that department. Through his efforts a considerable number of young men were sent abroad for the purpose of an education, a postal system was established, and other important changes inaugurated. He opposed to the utmost the conservative influence of China, which was a constant bar to all progress.

In the revolution which took place in December last he was appointed the Minister of Finance, but was universally recognized the most able and influential man in the Cabinet. Dreading the triumph of such progressive ideas, the Chinese officials sent their troops the following day to the palace and took possession of the king. Some of the Progressionists were captured and have since been put to death.

Kim Ok Kun and six of his companions fled to Japan, and are now awaiting the result of the negotiations going on between Japan and China. It is expected that the Chinese will be obliged to withdraw their troops from Corea, and the Government will then adopt an enlightened and progressive policy like that of Japan. The restoration of Kim Ok Kun and his friends to power is among the probabilities of the future, and is the sincere wish of all who seek the true welfare of the country."

LATER.—Rev. Messrs. Ross and Webster, of the U. P. Mission in Manchuria, have recently made a preaching tour from Moukden into "No Man's Land," the region in Manchuria bordering on Corea. In this region is now a large population both of Chinese and Coreans, who have voluntarily left their native land that they may enjoy greater freedom of thought and speech. Among these Coreans Mr. Ross has sent his colporters and translations of the Gospels and other Christian tracts and books, and these have been bought and gone into circulation in large numbers. The reports of the colporters of the results of their work, at length induced the missionaries to undertake a visit to this border region, to see for themselves the results of this work of their colporters. The journey of several hundred miles was made on horseback, in the intense cold, snow and sleet of winter, with an occasional breakage of the ice in crossing rivers, immersing both horse and rider; and after describing the journey and people Mr. Webster writes:

THE PEOPLE: KNOWLEDGE OF THE GOSPEL: NUMEROUS BAPTISMS.

"These humble cottars have been ploughing and sowing in these valleys for twenty years or more, leading about as uneventful a life as it is possible to imagine, without a single spark in their daily routine. But about two years ago an event occurred which changed the whole current of their life. Christ's glorious gospel reached the valley, and we believe the power of the Highest accompanied it. Hundreds have been led to inquire after the way of salvation, and many homes are to-day rejoicing in the knowledge of the 'glad tidings of great joy.' The origin, progress, and result of this movement are alike remarkable. No missionary has ever visited them; the gospels and tracts prepared and sent among them by Mr. Ross, combined with the personal witness-bearing of one or two who had come under the influence of the truth in Moukden, have alone been instrumental in bringing about this truly wonderful result. 'It is worth while to translate a few books,' said Mr. Ross, 'to see such results.' Yes, indeed, it is worth while. Some men never see the fruits of what they have been privileged to sow. We rejoice with our brother that he has been permitted to see, in such a marvellous degree, the fruits of his labours."

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REMARKS

Dr. Sam:

About one year ago, a young Air Force captain, an instructor of military history and Asian studies at the AF Academy, came to me for assistance with his thesis. Since his subject was early American military relations with Korea, an area that I had researched thoroughly, I was able to furnish him with excellent materials and leads.

His paper was well received and an article based on it appeared in the ~~no~~ 1975 Journal of the Social Sciences and Humanities. In the event you haven't seen the Journal, I am enclosing a copy for your information, retention and further reproduction as need be.

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FROM <i>Herman Katz</i> HERMAN M. KATZ Command Historian	DATE	9 Mar 76
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NAVY BLUE IN OLD KOREA:

— *The Asiatic Squadron and
the American Legation, 1882-1897* —

by

Donald M. Bishop*

The role of the United States Navy in Asia during the nineteenth century has been a topic of continuing interest to historians. Foster Rhea Dulles, Walter LaFeber, Milton Plesur, and Peter Karsten are only a few of the recent historians who have linked America's widening interest and influence in Asia with the modernization and expansion of the United States Navy in the 1880s after two decades of austere naval appropriations following the Civil War.¹

The Low-Rodgers expedition to Korea in 1871 and the Shufeldt-Li treaty of 1882 are the events which figure most prominently in discussions of the Navy and the old Kingdom of Korea.² The Navy's continuing role in the

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1. Foster Rhea Dulles, *Prelude to World Power: American Diplomatic History, 1860-1900* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1965), 123-7; Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), 58-60; Milton Plesur, *America's Outward Thrust: Approaches to Foreign Affairs, 1865-1890* (DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1971), ch. 6; and Peter Karsten, *The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism* (New York: The Free Press, 1972), 145-50.

The birth of the "modern" American Navy, sailing steam-powered armored ships, is generally dated from 1883, when Congress authorized four new steel cruisers to replace the aging and decrepit fleet of wood and canvas which the Navy had sailed since the Civil War. Of course, it was many years before the entire fleet took on a modern character; the U.S.S. *Monocacy*, for instance, remained in service from 1864 to 1903!

2. An excellent scholarly account of the 1871 expedition is found in Soo-Bok Choi, "Korea's Response to America and France in the Decade of the Taewon'gun, 1864-1873," in *Korea's Response to the West*, ed. by Yung-Hwan Jo (Kalamazoo: Korea Research Publication, 1971), 116-27. The captured Korean banners are on display at the United States Naval Academy alongside Spanish and Algerine trophies; see H. C. Washburn, *Illustrated Case Inscriptions of the Official Catalog of the Trophy Flags of the United States Navy* (Baltimore: The Lord Baltimore Press, 90-91, 100-101, 104-7).

The most useful accounts of the 1882 treaty negotiations, based on multilingual research, are Frederick Foo Chien, *The Opening of Korea: A Study of Chinese Diplomacy 1876-1885* (Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press, 1967), ch. IV, and

years after the treaty, however, has drawn little historical attention. The growing volume of scholarship concerning Korean-American relations during the reign of King Kojong has largely concentrated on the role of American diplomats in Seoul; scant attention has been devoted to the naval force which supported American policy. This paper, then, is an attempt to fill the void by describing the naval dimension of American relations with Korea between 1882 and 1897.

As American influence grew in Korea, so did the role of the Navy's Asiatic Squadron—one of the several American naval squadrons maintained overseas during the late nineteenth century. Next to diplomatic representatives, naval officers were the Americans most concerned with Korea during the initial period after the kingdom's opening to the West. Working with the American legation, the squadron protected America's growing interests—diplomatic, commercial, and missionary. In proportion to the personal concern of American ministers, the Squadron occasionally made an impact upon Korean internal affairs as well.

If fleets marked the true strength of a country in its international affairs, the United States was a minor power in Asia during the 1880s and 1890s. The Asiatic Squadron was small; it never exceeded eight ships (1895) and more usually numbered only five or six vessels.³ While the flagship was usually a modern cruiser, most of the other ships were long past their prime. United States Minister Augustine Heard visited the squadron enroute to Seoul in 1890; he was dismayed to discover that it included the *Omaha* ("old fashioned and small), the *Palos* ("a converted tugboat"), and the *Monocacy* ("a condemned river steamer"). The minister unpleasantly realized that the Japanese fleet could blow the American ships "to atoms."⁴ The squadron, moreover, patrolled

Chong-ik Eugene Kim and Han-Kyo Kim, *Korea and the Politics of Imperialism 1876-1910* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 18-29.

Both incidents are regarded by Soviet historians as evidence of capitalist imperialism; see *A Soviet View of the American Past* (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1960), 35, and *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia: A Translation of the Third Edition*, s.v. "United States-Korean Treaty of 1882," by G. D. Tiagai, 1-673.

3. Department of the Navy, *Annual Report[s] of the Secretary of the Navy* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1882-1897) for the years 1882 to 1897.
4. Augustine Heard to the Secretary of State, No. 3, 17 May 1890, Despatches from United States Ministers to Korea 1883-1905, Record Group 59 (General Records of the Department of State), National Archives, Washington (here after cited as "Diplomatic Despatches, Korea"). Ensign George Foulk once opined that even the Chinese Navy could defeat the American Asiatic Squadron; see Foulk to family, 26 October 1884, George C. Foulk Papers, Naval Historical Foundation Collections, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington (hereafter cited as "Foulk Papers, Library of Congress").

an area stretching from Ceylon to the Bering Sea, a task which sorely taxed the ingenuity of its commander-in-chief, a rear admiral. "With a small squadron, and every consul and missionary crying for ships," wrote one officer, "it makes an officer wish the government would wake up and give us more vessels."⁵

I. Routine Activities

The typical missions of the Asiatic Squadron to Korean waters indicate the routine activity in which it was normally engaged.⁶ Ships of the squadron usually transported American diplomats to and from Seoul and on any travels during their tours. On the few occasions that Korea sent diplomats to the United States (1883 and 1887), the Navy carried the envoys on part of their journey as a matter of international courtesy. Various ships surveyed the Korean coast, charting harbors, tides, depths, channels, and hazards to navigation. Journeys of the admiral to confer with the American minister in Seoul served doubly as goodwill visits. Groups of naval officers were regularly received at the Korean court, and the King seemed to take special interest in the naval visitors. On two occasions the flagship band travelled to Seoul with the officers so that the King could hear Western music. Such occasions were marked by ceremonies and parties, and the King graciously bestowed presents on the officers and crews.⁷

Most naval missions to Korea, however, were to protect American lives, and ships of the Squadron passed many long months at Chemulpo when ordered there in anticipation of, or during, a crisis. Chemulpo in the 1880s and 1890s was an uninviting port; the endless mud flats of the Han were broken only by rude Korean villages and the small foreign trading settlement. The Korean port was generally acknowledged as the *bete noire* of the Asiatic Squadron; there were no attractions or distractions for the men. A poet from the U.S.S.

5. F. P. Gilmore to Robert W. Shufeldt, 27 Dec. 1884, Robert F. Shufeldt Papers, Naval Historical Foundation Collections, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington (hereafter cited as "Shufeldt Papers").

6. These routine activities are amply documented in the files of the Seoul legation, now preserved in the National Archives, Record Group 84 (Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State), Post Records—Diplomatic—Korea. Letters from the squadron and ships at Chemulpo are filed under "Correspondence with Naval Officers," and the legation replies are in the "Miscellaneous Record Books." These two files are hereafter cited as "Legation Naval Correspondence" and "Legation Miscellaneous Letters," respectively.

7. E.G., Rear Admiral George Belknap to the Secretary of the Navy, 21 Oct 1889, copy in Legation Naval Correspondence; Foulk to family, 2 July 1884, Foulk Papers, Library of Congress.

Palos recorded these impressions in verse:

There's a singular country far over the seas.
 To the world it is known as Korea,
 Where there's nothing to charm one and nothing to please,
 And of cleanliness not an idea.

.....
 Where the houses they live in are mostly of dirt,—
 With a tumble down roof made of thatch,
 Where soap is unknown it is safe to assert,
 And vermin in myriads hatch.

.....
 Where those who escape never care to return
 To that Morning Calm country again
 For there's nothing on earth that would make a man yearn,
 For that far away land of Chosen.⁸

A Chemulpo tour was generally used to drill and exercise the crews. The Korean government allowed the squadron to conduct live firing and practice landings at Roze Island near the port.⁹

2. Naval Initiatives, 1882-1884

For a brief period following Admiral Shufeldt's successful negotiation of a treaty, the Navy was unusually active in Korea. In this respect it reflected the active and friendly foreign policy of President Chester Arthur and Secretary of State Frederick Frelinghuysen.

The first naval personnel to visit Korea after the negotiation of the Treaty were three young officers who had completed sea tours with the Asiatic Squadron. Ordered to new assignment with the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington, Lieutenant Benjamin Buckingham, Ensign Walter McLean, and Ensign George C. Foulk were authorized by the Secretary of the Navy to return to the United States via Asiatic Russia. The Japanese steamer which carried them to Vladivostok stopped at the Mitsubishi trading stations in Korea.

8. "Cruising in the Pacific," *New York Times*, 26 Feb. 1890, 9; "Notes and Comments," *Korean Repository* 4 (1897), 120. The poem is attributed to a Lieutenant Bostwick; it is quoted in Arthur Judson Brown, "A Reading Journey Through Korea," *Chautauquan* 41 (1905), 510-11. Despite their negative attitude, American sailors and marines in Korea seem to have been well behaved and disciplined; see Sally Sill diary letter, 26 Feb. 1895, and John M. B. Sill to Joseph Sill, 10 Feb. 1895, John Malhelm Berry Sill Papers, Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

9. "Cruising in the Pacific"; Commander C. S. Cotton to Lucius H. Foote, 27 May 1883, 12 Sep. 1883, Legation Naval Correspondence.

Because the Shufeldt treaty had not yet been ratified by the Senate, the Japanese shipping company refused to allow the three Americans to land at Pusan. Faced with this refusal, the officers hailed a small boat and went over the side while no one was looking.

After a walk through the Korean village beyond the Japanese trading post, the three officers returned to the steamer to write a report and continue the journey to Russia. They carefully noted the harbor marks, tides, and pilotage; described the Japanese trading settlement and the lack of military posts; and enumerated the items of trade (hides, bones, cotton, bamboo paper, furs, and ginseng). They also wrote their impressions of the newly-opened nation.¹⁰ Closing their report on Korea, they mentioned the observation of a Russian trader who often dealt with North Koreans who crossed the border for trade. Describing from intuition how Korea would react to the world beyond her borders, he predicted a rapid "somersault to civilization."¹¹

In July, 1882, only two months after the signing of the Shufeldt treaty, the U.S.S. *Monocacy* was dispatched to Korea to show the flag, make initial navigation surveys, and report to the Admiral. The vessel touched at Wonsan, Pusan, and the Komun islands. At each port, visits were exchanged with local officials and the captain allowed townspeople aboard his vessel to satisfy their curiosity.¹²

The visit to the Komun islands (Port Hamilton) was to judge their suitability as a site for a naval coaling station.¹³ The *Monocacy's* survey proved satisfactory, and the next year the Secretary of the Navy included the islands on a proposed list of coaling stations for American naval forces. "The United States should not be dependent upon the ports of the great powers for coal," he stated, recommending the establishment of stations at Haiti, Curacao, Brazil, Madagascar, Monrovia, Fernando Po, and Port Hamilton. The Secretary also believed that a regular American-flag steamer line should connect Port Hamilton, the Korean mainland, and Japan.¹⁴

10. Benjamin H. Buckingham, George C. Foulk, and Walter McLean, *Observations Upon the Korean Coast, Japanese Korean Ports, and Siberia* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1883), 8-15.

11. *Ibid.*, 16.

12. Cotton to Rear Admiral J. M. B. Clitz, 7 July 1882, Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding Officers of Squadrons—Asiatic Squadron Letters, Record Group 45 (Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library), National Archives, Washington (hereafter cited as "Asiatic Squadron Letters").

13. *Ibid.*: Cotton noted that the harbor was of fair size, protected in all weather, had high tides but no currents, and was a good anchorage.

14. Department of the Navy, *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for the Year 1883*, 2 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1884), I, 31.

The ambitious program was again recommended in 1884 but was dropped by the new administration in 1885. Washington expressed no further interest, even when W. W. Rockhill reported in 1887 that Britain's withdrawal from the islands provided an ideal opportunity to open negotiations with an agreeable Korean government.¹⁵

The *Monocacy* was soon to return to Korea on an important mission. Two months after signing the treaty with the United States, a military revolt—the *Im'o Kunnon*—broke out in Seoul. The details of the disturbance need not be discussed here, except to recall the military results. The Taewon'gun seized power and requested Chinese troops to help assert his control; several thousand were soon sent by Li Hung-Chang. Belatedly hearing of the revolt from their survivors, the Japanese government determined to return Minister Hanabusa to Korea, backed by warships and infantry, to demand satisfaction for the killing of Japanese nationals. When the Japanese troops reached Chemulpo, Japan was on the verge of war with China.¹⁶

In Shanghai at the time was John Russell Young, the American Minister-designate to China. Young had just passed through Japan and held extensive talks with Japanese leaders. He was convinced that neither China nor Japan wanted war. Since the United States was the only other nation which had diplomatic relations with Korea at that time, Young believed that American mediation might increase the chance of an amicable settlement.¹⁷ The Minister conferred with Rear Admiral J. M. B. Clitz, the Asiatic Squadron commander, and with Washington's concurrence the U.S.S. *Monocacy* was placed at Young's disposal.¹⁸

Young's instructions to Commander C. S. Cotton, captain of the vessel, how that his first concern was not only to demonstrate solidarity with Japan over the killing of her nationals, but also to restrain the island nation from harsh action in Korea. Cotton was to observe and report, counsel moderation

15. W. W. Rockhill to the Secretary of State, No. 47, 13 Jan. 1887, in *Korean-American Relations: Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States*, 2 vols., vol. 1 ed. by George M. McCune and John A. Harrison, vol. 2 ed. by Spencer J. Palmer (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951-63), II, 240 (hereafter cited as *KAR*). See also Foulk to G. M. Foulk, 30 June 1885, Foulk Papers, Library of Congress, and Kenneth J. Hagan, *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-1889* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973), 43.
16. Andrew C. Nahm, "Reaction and Response to the Opening of Korea, 1876-1884," in *Korea's Response to the West*, 144; Kim and Kim, *Korea and the Politics of Imperialism*, 36-7.
17. Tyler Dennett, "American Choices in the Far East in 1882," *American Historical Review* 30 (1924-5), 87n. Most of the important despatches concerning the mission are reprinted in the article.
18. Clitz to the Secretary of the Navy, No. 67, 9 Aug. 1882, Asiatic Squadron Letters.

to the Japanese, remain neutral if there were an act of aggression, contact the Korean authorities, and provide them "such moral support as may be possible." The Minister noted that American interests in Korea were only "in embryo," but that their potential should not be imperiled by indifference to an act of violence against another country's nationals. He further believed that American "good offices" could prevent a war.¹⁹

The *Monocacy* arrived at Chemulpo on August 12, 1882, anchoring among the Chinese and Japanese warships. Commander Cotton visited the admirals and local Korean officials and sought to confer with Minister Hanabusa. The Japanese, however, was busy negotiating in Seoul. Cotton's role, then, was to demonstrate American concern by his presence. By September 3, China, Japan, and Korea had come to an agreement.²⁰

The results of Minister Young's active efforts (he preferred to call the American interest "officious") in the situation are difficult to judge. The Japanese envoys possessed explicit instructions to refuse the "good offices" of any other power.²¹ Commander Cotton thus had no active role in the negotiations. When Minister Young reached Peking, however, the Tsungli Yamen profusely expressed its thanks, saying that the presence of an American warship "contributed greatly to a peaceful settlement."²² For the Korean government, it was a timely indication that the United States intended to abide by its promises of friendly help and assistance.

3. Protecting Lives and Commerce

The activity of the United States Navy in Korea reflected the same twin foci of policy as did American foreign relations for the period. On the one hand, naval officers and American diplomats adhered to the overall lines of policy established by the administration in Washington. On the other hand, distance and disinterest provided opportunity for a considerable local influ-

19. John R. Young to Clitz, 1 Aug. 1882, enclosure to Young to the Secretary of State, No. 5, 19 Aug. 1882, Despatches from United States Ministers to China, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington; Cotton to Clitz, 14 Aug. 1882, enclosure to Clitz to the Secretary of the Navy, No. 73, 7 Sep. 1882, Asiatic Squadron Letters.

20. Cotton to Clitz, 15 Aug. 1882, enclosure to Clitz to the Secretary of the Navy, No. 73, 7 Sep. 1882, Asiatic Squadron Letters. For the Chemulpo treaty, see Kim and Kim, *Korea and the Politics of Imperialism*, 38-9, and Hanabusa Nagamichi, "The First Half of the Meiji: From the Restoration through the Treaty of Shimonoseki," in *Japan-American Diplomatic Relations in the Meiji-Taisho Era*, Kamikawa Hikomatsu, ed. (Tokyo: Pan Pacific Press, 1958), 116-17.

21. Chien, *The Opening of Korea*, 106.

22. Young to the Secretary of State, No. 27, 2 Oct. 1882, Diplomatic Despatches, China.

ence on the routine definition of policy; naval commanders and diplomats in the nineteenth century had considerable authority to make on-the-spot decisions and press their own concerns on policy. This latitude, however, can be easily exaggerated. Naval commanders reported their activities in detail through the chain of command to the Secretary of the Navy; American ministers similarly reported to the Secretary of State. Most restrained any personal or local enthusiasms since they realized their actions were subject to review and possible reprimand.

Generally, the Asiatic Squadron wanted little to do with Korea. Visiting officers were repelled by the filth of the country and the corruption of the government. Chemulpo was an uninviting port. American commercial interests were small. A tour of duty on the Asiatic Station proved no opportunity for a naval officer to become involved with Korea. Any officers, like George C. Foulk, who came to develop strong attachments to the East did so in Japan.²³

The Navy responded to actual threats against American lives expeditiously, and ships deployed to Chemulpo whenever violence broke out in Seoul. However, Americans in Korea wanted ships to respond to potential threats as well as actual ones. Judging when a threat was really a threat often divided the legation and the Squadron.

Minister Foote expressed a typical apprehension within two months of his arrival in Seoul.

I find myself and family in the midst of a people, whose ways and customs are totally different from our own, and to whom I am an object of curiosity Although the government is well disposed there is a large party opposed to what they consider foreign innovations Whether the government is strong enough to control this element is a matter which I am not prepared to discuss. The presence of an American man-of-war would be most acceptable and would have a good moral effect upon these peculiar people.²⁴

The Navy Department instructed Admiral Clitz and his successor, Rear Admiral John Lee Davis, to maintain a ship at Chemulpo; various ships were in Korean waters for a year, combining their deterrent function with coastal surveys.²⁵ As soon as affairs seemed stable, the Admiral withdrew the vessel.

23. For naval attitudes concerning Japan, see Karsten, *The Naval Aristocracy*, 215; "Captured by Japanese Girls," newspaper clipping, n.d., George C. Foulk Papers, New York Public Library (hereafter cited as "Foulk Papers, New York Public Library"); and Sill to the Secretary of State, No. 33, 24 July 1891, Diplomatic Despatches, Korea.

24. Lucas H. Foote to Rear Admiral Pierce Crosby, 14 July 1883, Asiatic Squadron Letters.

25. See, e.g., Commanding Officer, U.S.S. *Juniata*, to Foote, 31 March 1884, and Crosby to Foote, 7 Aug. 1883, Legation Naval Correspondence.

When Ensign Foulk informed Minister Foote of the potential for violence in October, 1884, therefore, no ship was on station. In November, the minister wrote the admiral of the present danger, but there was no response.²⁶ On the actual outbreak of the *emeute* of 1884 and the attack on the Japanese legation, Foote cabled bluntly, "Send a gunboat at once."²⁷ The U.S.S. *Trenton* arrived belatedly, and Ensign John Baptiste Bernadou escorted the refugees gathered in the American legation to safety at the port.²⁸ A ship remained in Chemulpo until the Chinese-Japanese agreement of April, 1885, concerning mutual troops withdrawals.

The pattern recurred for a decade: a crisis would bring a ship to Chemulpo; a guard of Marines or sailors would march to Seoul to protect the legation. The crisis subsided; the captain wanted his crewmen returned and the admiral wanted the ship free for duty elsewhere. The minister and the American community, however, desired that the vessel remain, "just in case." The ship would finally be withdrawn, and when the next crisis came the American community was confirmed in its belief that the Navy had been short-sighted to leave them unprotected.

The relations between the Navy and the legation were mercurial in 1887 and 1888. W. W. Rockhill got off on the wrong foot by asking for a warship at Chemulpo to enforce his demand for the settlement of a dispute between the Korean government and an American citizen concerning a piece

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26. Foote to Rear Admiral John Lee Davis, 18 Nov. 1884, enclosure to Davis to the Secretary of the Navy, 13 Dec. 1884, Asiatic Squadron Letters.
 27. Foote to Davis, 5 Dec. 1884, enclosure to Davis to the Secretary of the Navy, 13 Dec. 1884, Asiatic Squadron Letters.
 28. Ensign Bernadou (1858-1908) was temporarily assigned to Seoul as a representative of the Smithsonian Institution engaged in "scientific explorations." The Japanese government commended him for his action as escort to the refugees, presenting him with two vases as a token of appreciation.

Bernadou's role in Korea has been little noted; for his activities, see Foote to the Secretary of State, No. 128, 17 Dec. 1884, *KAR*, I, 97-101; enclosures to Secretary of State to Foulk, No. 58, 31 July 1885, *KAR*, I, 47-9; Mary V. Lawrence, *A Diplomat's Helpmate: How Rose F. Foote, Wife of the First United States Minister and Envoy Extraordinary to Korea, Served Her Country in the Far East* (San Francisco: H.S. Crocker Co., 1918), 30; Horace N. Allen, *Things Korean: A Collection of Sketches and Anecdotes Missionary and Diplomatic* (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1908), 68, 71; and J. B. Bernadou, "Korea and the Koreans," *National Geographic Magazine* 2 (1890), 224-243. For Foulk's unfavorable estimate of Bernadou, see Foulk to Washington Irving Chambers, Washington Irving Chambers Papers, Naval Historical Foundations Collections, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington.

Bernadou subsequently had a distinguished career in the Navy. He was cited for bravery during the Spanish-American War and developed smokeless powder for use in naval guns; see Capt. D. W. Knox to F. Dardie, 22 May 1934, s.v. "Bernadou, J. B.," in the Biography (ZB) File, Naval History Division, Washington

of property at the port.²⁹ Admiral Ralph Chandler virtually exploded at the charge. "It is useless to ask me for a ship to arbitrate a claim which is purely diplomatic . . ."³⁰

The Admiral had an opportunity to explain his views when he carried the new American minister, Hugh A. Dinsmore, to Seoul on the U.S.S. *Marion* in April, and he was willing enough to sail to Korea the first time Dinsmore requested a ship to deter violence against Ensign Foulk. But naval impatience with such duty in Korea was soon communicated to the minister. Captain Theodore F. Jewell of the *Essex* ventured the opinion that "it was a damned shame to have to send a man of war here to protect half a dozen missionaries. And that if he (Jewell) was King of Korea he would cut off the head of every damned missionary in the country &c &c." The captain further antagonized the minister by "traducing" Korea and her people and by gratuitously expressing the view that Dinsmore had "taken up Foulk's and Old Shufeldt's visionary . . . notions where they had left off."³¹

Despite Jewell's bluntness, the Navy responded when foreign residents were threatened in the "baby riots" of 1888. Jewell was at first obstinately reluctant to send a guard to Seoul on mere rumors of anti-foreign sentiment, but he did so when the threat became more serious; Admiral Chandler approved the decision.³² A large legation guard stayed at Seoul throughout the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 and 1895.

4. The Squadron in Korean Internal Affairs

The naval officers' dislike of Korean duty stands in contrast to the attitudes of American diplomats in Seoul. Whatever their differences in party and temperament, the American ministers developed common sympathies for Korea. Lucius H. Foote, George C. Foulk, Hugh A. Dinsmore, Augustine Heard, John M. B. Sill, and Horace N. Allen represent an unbroken series of American representatives who made Korea's concerns their concerns. Each of these men sought to use the influence of the United States to support the kingdom, and

Navv Yard. A World War I destroyer bore his name.

29. For the dispute, see W. W. Rockhill to the Secretary of State, No. 53, 24 Jan. 1887, *KAR*, II, 86; Rockhill to Rear Admiral Ralph Chandler, 26 Jan. 1887, Legation Miscellaneous Letters.

30. Chandler to Rockhill, 5 Feb. 1887, Legation Naval Correspondence.

31. Hugh A. Dinsmore to Foulk, 31 July 1887, Foulk Papers, New York Public Library.

32. Chandle. to Dinsmore, 7 July 1888, Commander Theodore F. Jewell to Dinsmore, 19 June 1888, 20 June 1888, Legation Naval Correspondence; Charles Chaille-Lonz, *My Life on Four Continents* (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1912), II, 349-50.

they all desired that the Asiatic Squadron support their policies. Depending on circumstance and the personality of the station or vessel commander, they found a response.

The presence of an American guard at the legation had an unusual impact in Korea. Factions in the nobility and foreign powers frequently threatened to take over the government, and the King lived in constant fear of his own safety. The American legation was close to the palace, and the King derived some peace of mind by the presence of a guard there. Thus, on several occasions the unusual situation occurred where the monarch actually desired the presence of an American military force in Seoul. The American ministers, who were happy to have the guard for their own benefit, would have liked to accommodate the monarch.

Protecting American lives was one matter, but the Navy had no patience with such an idea, King or no. Captain Jewell embarrassed Minister Dinsmore at one audience by raising the issue directly. In the course of the audience Captain Jewell announced that the *Essex* would remain at Chemulpo fifteen days. The King remarked that he would prefer that the ship remain at the port all the time, adding diplomatically, "it would enable us all to see more of each other and beget more intimate association." As Dinsmore related with consternation, "his august captaincy spoke up in a rather petulant way 'that might as well be settled now and here'" and told the Minister to inform the King that was quite impossible. Dinsmore earned his pay with a quick consiliatory reply to cover Jewell's impertinence, but confided that he was "full up to the neck" with the captain.³³

Dinsmore had another opportunity to call on the Navy in 1887. That year, the King decided to send a permanent diplomatic mission to the United States. Yuan Shih-K'ai was displeased at this show of independence and determined to prevent it. He dissuaded the envoys from leaving Korea and demanded that the King request the Emperor's permission to send them. Since the Korean-American treaty of 1882, negotiated with China's direct aid, explicitly allowed the two governments to exchange diplomats, Dinsmore became energetic in his support of the King against the Chinese resident.³⁴ He

33. Dinsmore to Foulk, 31 July 1887, Foulk Papers, New York Public Library.

34. The embassy is discussed in M. Frederick Nelson, *Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1946), 185-88; Fred Harvey Harrington, *God Mammon and the Japanese: Dr. Horace N. Allen and Korean-American Relations 1884-1905* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1914), 228-34; Robert T. Pollard, "American Relations with Korea 1882-1895," *Chinese Social and Political Science Review* 16 (1932-3), 449. For Chinese interference see Dinsmore to the Secretary of State, No. 53, 30 Sep. 1887, *KAR*, II, 101-4.

arranged for the U.S.S. *Omaha* to transport the envoys to the United States.³⁵

Dr. Horace N. Allen, acting as secretary to the Korean diplomats, believed that the action strengthened the King's will against the Chinese. He related in his memoirs how the *Omaha* sailed from Chemulpo with the envoys under the guns of six Chinese warships sent to intercept them.³⁶ Actually, the way had been cleared for the embassy by the King's abject obedience to the Chinese; he memorialized the Emperor for permission to send them in the humblest terms.³⁷ Nonetheless, the willingness of the minister to use the Navy in the role is significant, even if the King's resolve failed in the crisis.

In 1890, the Dowager Queen of Korea died, and the King feared violence among the factions. The monarch sent an official to the American legation to request that a guard be sent from the squadron to protect the palace. When Minister Heard replied that a guard could only protect Americans, the official was just stunned. Undaunted, however, he ventured the opinion that since the trouble would in all probability extend through the city and involve Americans, why not send the guard? Given the possibility of a threat to the foreign residents, Heard did ask that men be sent to the capital, confident that he had communicated proper distinction to the King's intermediary. The next morning, however, the official returned to the legation to ask when the troops would take post in the palace! Heard kept the troops at the legation.³⁸

Heard again asked for men in October, 1890, when the Queen's state funeral filled the city with strangers. At a rehearsal for the procession, two guilds had quarrelled, and before the fighting was over eighteen had died. The minister felt that the occasion provided an opportunity for the King's enemies to stage an emeute and hoped to forestall it with a prudent show of force.³⁹

The Japanese and Chinese representatives received information of the proposed movement of American troops to Seoul and protested to Minister Heard. To the two powers, the minister stated that the guard was intended only as his own escort as a friendly nation showed its respect for the late

35. Jewell to Dinsmore, 26 Sep. 1887, Commander L. V. McNair to Dinsmore, 14 Nov. 1887, Legation Naval Correspondence.

36. Allen, *Things Korean*, 163.

37. Nelson, *Korea and the Old Orders*, 186-7; Harrington, *God Mammon and the Japanese*, 233. The King's memorial is enclosed in Charles Denby to the Secretary of State, No. 521, *KAR*, II, 110-12.

38. Heard to Rear Admiral George Belknap, 6 June 1890, Legation Miscellaneous Letters.

39. Heard to Commander M. L. Johnson, 9 Oct. 1890, Heard to Belknap, 14 Oct. 1890, Legation Miscellaneous Letters.

Queen.¹⁰ To the admiral, however, Heard explained "confidentially" that the guard was needed to deter any outbreak of violence during the funeral.⁴¹

Fifty men were sent to Scoul from the U.S.S. *Swatara*. During the ceremonies, twenty remained at the legation and thirty preceded the funeral procession to the reviewing area set aside for the foreign diplomats. There they formed ranks as "escort" to the minister and saluted as the bier went by.⁴²

Admiral George Belknap approved the action in a later dispatch, but it was the last time the Navy was to so cooperate.⁴³ In 1891, the admiral ventured the opinion that "these rumors of possible revolutionary disturbances in Seoul are chronic in character and have no positive foundation."⁴⁴ His successor resisted deeping a ship at Chemulpo due to more important demands on the Squadron in other areas.⁴⁵

The disturbances in the provinces related to the Tonghak rebellion in 1893 and 1894 upset the foreign community in Seoul considerably. They pressed the American minister, John M. B. Sill, to order a ship to Chemulpo. Rear Admiral Skerrett demurred in May, 1894, protesting that disturbance was the normal state of affairs in Korea and that no ship was necessary.⁴⁶ Once again, however, the admiral's judgement proved overconfident, for the rebellion led to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War on June 25, and the *Baltimore* was sent to Chemulpo. The fighting in the city area was soon over, and Captain B. F. Day wanted to leave the Korean port. He assured Minister Sill that Americans would be in no danger provided they "attend to their own affairs and avoid politics."⁴⁷

By "politics" the admiral probably meant the pro-Korean tendencies of the missionary community and of Sill himself. The minister was willing to allow the King to seek asylum in the American legation if there was a threat to his life. Skerrett voiced a strong opinion that he hoped such action would not be encouraged.⁴⁸ Later the Navy took issue with Sill's granting the King

40. Heard to Yuan Shih-K'ai, Heard to M. Kondo, 11 Oct. 1890, Legation Miscellaneous Letters.

41. Heard to Johnson, 9 Oct. 1890, Legation Miscellaneous Letters.

42. Heard to Belknap, 14 Oct. 1890, Legation Miscellaneous Letters.

43. Belknap to the Secretary of the Navy, 4 Nov. 1890, copy in Legation Naval Correspondence.

44. Belknap to Heard, 15 Dec. 1891, Legation Naval Correspondence.

45. Rear Admiral D. B. Harmony to Heard, 6 Aug. 1892, Legation Naval Correspondence.

46. Rear Admiral J. S. Skerrett to John M. B. Sill, 17 May 1894, Lieutenant Commander J. H. Dayton to Heard, 23 Apr. 1893, Legation Naval Correspondence.

47. Captain B. F. Day to Sill, 20 July 1894, Legation Naval Correspondence.

48. Sill to the Secretary of State, No. 16, 29 June 1894, *KAR*, II, 335; Henry D. Northrop, *The Flowery Kingdom and the Land of the Mikado* (N.p., 1894), 577-8; Skerrett to Sill, 26 June 1894, Legation Naval Correspondence.

permission to store specie for safety in the American compound and his suggestion to post troops in the palace to protect the King after the Queen's murder by the Japanese. "One feels a great deal of sympathy for the King under the circumstance," wrote one captain, but protecting the royal person "would seem so directly political that the direction of assent of the Home government would seem absolutely necessary."⁴⁹ In these actions the Asiatic Squadron, not Minister Sill, more truly represented the foreign policy of the United States. Secretary of State Richard Olney frequently reprimanded Minister Sill for his partisan posture in Korea.

For the Queen's funeral in 1897, the King asked that a guard be sent from the Asiatic Squadron as had been done in 1890; Minister Allen knew better than to forward the request to the admiral. Although a few naval officers travelled from the U.S.S. *Boston* at Chemulpo as Allen's personal guests on the occasion, they took no part in the ceremonies. The King's person was protected during the procession by four husky Russian petty officers.⁵⁰ No more than a handful of American military officers would visit Seoul for almost half a century. Then, the surrender of the Japanese Empire would bring Russian and American soldiers to Korean once again.

In recent years there has been a new interest in the Navy in Asia during the nineteenth century, especially its role in the penetration of American commerce.⁵¹ A review of American naval policy in Korea, however, shows that initiative for the extension of American influence came from the legation, not the Asiatic Squadron. In the one instance where American diplomats would a commercial advantage using naval force, the request was refused. If the Shufeldt negotiations for a treaty with Korea represent emergence of American commercial imperialism in Asia, there was surprisingly little naval follow-through. The attempt by American ministers and the Korean government to use the Asiatic Squadron to stabilize the Korean political scene is most significant, not as a sign of American expansion, but as a sign that the Yi dynasty had an imperfect control over the Korean social order. Domestic unrest or foreign intervention threatened the King and the government frequently. In 1882 and 1884 there were outright coup attempts; in 1886 Yuan

49. Rear Admiral C. C. Carpenter to Sill, 17 Jan. 1895, Commander C. Stockton to Sill, 12 Nov. 1895, Legation Naval Correspondence.

50. Horace N. Allen to the Secretary of State, No. 39, 27 Nov. 1897, Diplomatic Despatches, Korea.

51. For the aggressive role of the Navy in American commerce, see Karsten, *The Naval Aristocracy*, 145-50, and Charles Beard, *The Idea of National Interest* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1934; reprint ed., Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966), 100. A more satisfactory discussion is Hagan, *American Gunboat Diplomacy*, 3-4, 9-10.

Shih-K'ai threatened to depose the monarch; in 1894 the Japanese seized the palace as a prelude to subjugating the country; the Queen suffered a brutal death at the hands of Japanese assassins in 1897. These events could only have been prevented by an effective central administration backed by a reliable and effective military forces. King Kojong possessed neither.

The first American diplomat reached Seoul the year following the 1882 soldier's revolt. The United States had shown its friendly concern for Korea in the *Monouacy* mission; Minister Foote was helpful; and the Korean envoys to the United States reported a willingness in Washington to help Korea. From these beginnings, the King hoped that American good will could also be expressed more concretely—that is, with the assistance of the Asiatic Squadron. Since American ministers in Seoul were sympathetic to the King's desires, the American naval force occasionally played a role on the Korean domestic scene at their request. These incidents between the King, the ministers, and the squadron, are signs that the King wanted foreign assistance in supressing occasional symptoms of breakdown. In general, however, the United States proved uncooperative. Without assistance, the forces of internal disorder and international aggrandizement would in time lead to the dynasty's downfall.

Feb 8th

MRS GEORGE W. MC KEE
1055 MOREWOOD AVENUE
PITTSBURGH, PA

My dear Mr. Rhodes

Your letter of Dec 18
 was duly received. Now
 as I - St. McKee you write
 about. He was my hus-
 bands brother. My husband
 told me that Admiral
 Rodgers asked permission
 to make soundings in the
 river when the boats were
 fired on. The Admiral
 had gone to Korea to inquire
 about the ^(Sinking) ship which the
 Koreans captured and killed
 nearly all the crew. I saw
 the anchor chains when I was
 at Panyan. The Col
 Dr. R. McKee was my husbands
 Justice a West Pointer and
 killed at Buena Vista

The letter you speak of was
in Lt Hugh McKeel at
Annapolis.

Now about the dreadful
tragedy of poor Jane Lewis
Possibly had we known
how ill she had been be-
fore she came to us we
might have done more
But in that case I should
have been opposed to her
being in the home. But
we will have to fall back
on what has been such
a comfort to me Mary
a true God over rules
all. So I just will not
let myself wonder if we
did our best. Everyone
there Mrs Morris the Local
Com. all did what they
thought right

연 세 의 료 원
Yonsei University Medical Center

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Pill Whoon Hong, M.D.

Vice-President for Medical Affairs,

Director of Medical Center

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Phone 392-3361

Dr. Samuel Hugh Moffett
Henry W. Luce
Professor of Ecumenics and Mission
31 Alexander Street
Princeton, NJ 08540
U. S. A.

September 18, 1985

Dear Sam and Eileen,


Thank you ever so much for making the extra effort to find the information on Kwang He Won which is so critical this stage in our restoration plan. The architect can now go ahead and finish the drawings of the building. The lay-out of the building gives me a different impression from what I obtained from the only photography we have of Kwang He Won. Certainly, it is going to need a thorough going over by people who are more knowledgeable in this field.

The Chinese letters that I can think of for "Hey Min So" would be, "House of Blessed People" and not "House of Civilized Vertue". I will continue to inquire further.

We will be back in New Haven during October to attend the wedding of our oldest son, Steve, which takes place on the 12th. We will arrive in New York on the 10th. On the 13th, we will fly to Chicago to attend the American College of Surgeons Meeting which will be held the following week. I will try to call you at some time, from somewhere, as I did the last time.

On behalf of the Yonsei Medical Staff as well as the alumni group, I want to thank you again for your kindness. It means a great deal to us.

Sincerely yours,


Pill Whoon Hong, M.D.
Vice-President for
Medical Affairs

CC: Dr. Horace Underwood

ROBERT SAMUEL MACLAY, MISSIONARY IN JAPAN.

It will be impossible, within the prescribed limits of the following sketch, to present more than a meagre outline of the unfinished life of one still filling his place in the effective ranks, who has been connected, during an unbroken period of nearly thirty-nine years, with the foreign missionary service of the Methodist Episcopal Church; and who has been identified with this service in three kingdoms—China, Japan, and Korea. We can only supply some important dates, and glance at the more prominent events and results of a career devoted with exceptional persistency and singleness of purpose to the Redeemer's cause in heathen lands.

The records of his family, which cover a period of almost two hundred years, show that the subject of this sketch sprang from a sturdy Scotch-Irish ancestry. His parents were of Presbyterian descent, but during the early years of their wedded life they became members of the Methodist Episcopal Church.

Robert Samuel Maclay, the youngest but one of a family of four sons and five daughters, was born February 7th, 1824, in the village of Concord, Franklin Co., Penna. His early youth was spent with his pious parents in his native village, where he attended the public school. In the summer of 1840 he was converted, and shortly afterward became a member of the Methodist Episcopal Church. He entered the preparatory department of Dickinson College, Carlisle, Penna., September, 1840, where he received fresh inspiration from his teachers, Rev. Levi Scott, D.D., and Rev. Thomas Bowman, A.M. Completing two years course of study in one, he entered the Freshman class of the college September, 1841, and in due course graduated with honor July 10th, 1845. He still delights to name with affectionate regard his instructors Durbin, Emory, Caldwell, M'Clintock, Allen and Crooks. In 1864 his Alma Mater conferred on him the degree of D.D.

Immediately after graduating, he was appointed to the

Millin Circuit, in Pennsylvania, where he labored successfully for eight months. At the annual session of the Conference, held in Baltimore, he was received on trial and appointed to Gettysburg. This was a year of marked success to the young preacher. More than one hundred united with the church. While laboring zealously in this fruitful field, he called, June 21st, 1847, on Rev. Robert Emory, D.D., then president of Dickinson College, who asked him to spend the night with him,

as he had an important matter for his consideration, saying that he had just sent him a letter urging him to consent to his offering his name as a missionary to China.

He continued his labors on the Gettysburg Circuit till September 10th, 1847, when he received from Bishop Hamline his appointment as missionary to China. On the 13th of the following month, in company with Rev. Henry Hickok and wife, he sailed from New York in the ship "Paul Jones," and reached Hong Kong February 5th, 1848. They left Hong Kong February 23d, and arrived at Foochow April 14th, where they were cordially welcomed by Rev. M. C. White and Rev. J. D. Collins, the pioneer missionaries of

our church to China. As yet a suitable locality for a mission compound had not been secured. On September 27th, 1848, an eligible site was obtained on the south side of the Min River, in the southern suburbs of Foochow. Soon was begun the erection of the first house built by foreigners in Foochow.

Mr. Hickok's failing health compelled him to return to the United States early in 1849, and January 19th, Mr. Maclay alone took possession of the new house.

The acquisition of the Chinese language was the first task at the young missionary, and to it he devoted himself with vigor and success. Coming directly from the inspiring scenes of the religious revival which attended his labors in the home land, and regarding preaching as the divinely appointed agency for the diffusion of Christi-

